ABSTRACT While network attack and defense are experiencing a rapid change, the current research achievements of network security based on traditional game theory fail to characterize the real-time performance of the actual network attack-defense process accurately. Furthermore, all kinds of disturbance and accidental factors would affect the evolution of the network security state. Therefore, to tackle with the randomness of network security state and the high dynamic of network defense decision making, we analyzed the attack-defense behaviors from the perspectives of dynamic and real-time confrontation. Then we constructed the Markov attack-defense differential game model for the dynamic analysis to predict multi-stage continuous attack-defense process by combining differential game models and the Markov decision-making method. In addition, according to the discounted total payoffs of attack-defense game, we designed the objective function of the game. Based on previous statements, we proposed the multistage game equilibrium solution and designed the optimal defense strategy selection algorithm. Finally, we conducted simulations to demonstrate that the proposed model and method could shed some light to the real-time interplay of decision making between attack and defense.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays the network infrastructure has become a critical and fragile component for the organic operation of the information society. As a result, it is urgent to enhance network defense capabilities and to ensure the safety of cyberspace with the approaching challenges for network security. The essence of cybersecurity is attack and defense [1] , while game theory is the theory of decision-making which studies the direct interactions between decision-making entities [2] . The contradictory objectives, the non-cooperation relationship and the strategy dependence of network attack and defense all coincide with the essential characteristics of game theory [3] . Therefore using game theory to analyze network security problems and model attack-defense behaviors is getting more and more attention in recent years.
Previously, some researches on game theoretic analysis of network attack and defense were done. By constructing the static game model [4] - [6] , White et al. formalized and analyzed the network attack-defense behavior. Jiang et al. studied the selection of the optimal defense strategy.
And Liu et al. proposed the performance evaluation method of the anti-worm defense strategies. However, it is of greater value to construct a network attack-defense model by dynamic game theory in the actual network incident. Because the attackers and defenders generally do not move simultaneously. In [7] , Wang-Qun et al. studied the strategy selection towards active defense by modeling the network security problem as a dynamic game. By introducing the stochastic game theory, Wei et al. [8] and Fengming and Yongsheng [9] conducted quantitative analysis on the attack-defense network, and put forward some effective suggestions on optimal defense strategy. Considering the selection process influenced by the attack and defense behavior information, Dingkun and Jihong [10] came up with a novel method for the information security risk assessment and Shordon and Qing [11] analyzed refined Bayesian game equilibrium to solve the defense strategy selection by developing attack-defense signal game model. Taking the multi stages and continuity of attack-defense process into further consideration, Hengwei and Tao [12] constructed the multi-stage attack-defense signaling game model and studied the decision-making problem in the multi-stage attackdefense process with limited information.
However, the dynamic multi-stage game model can only study the time-varying and discrete attack-defense process. As a result, the researches based on the traditional dynamic games can not meet the higher requirement for realtime defense decision-making, as the network attack-defense process is becoming continuous and dynamic with highfrequency. To describe the continuous control process in realtime confrontation [13] , differential games can be adopted to analyze the dynamic and continuous change of system states and decision-making control, which has become a new research tool in the field of network security. In [14] , Nilim and Ghaoui constructed the attack-defense differential game model and analyzed the dynamic and continuous attackdefense process by simulating the general laws of attack and defense behaviors over time. However, the specific saddlepoint strategy solution algorithm and game equilibrium analysis were not given, reducing the application values of their work.
In the actual network attack and defense, all the attackdefense behaviors, the change of attack-defense strategies, and the change of the network system operating environment may lead to dynamic and random changes of the system security states. Some scholars combined the game theory and Markov decision-making methods to integrate the dynamic evolvement of the network attack-defense process and the randomness of the system state changes. Then they analyzed the network attack-defense process as a multi-stage Markov process to improve the practicality of the results. By combining the matrix game model with Markov decision-making process, Wei et al. [15] proposed the attack-defense stochastic game model that describes the attack-defense contradiction in network security problems and chose the optimal defense strategies. In the overall framework for the network attackdefense experiments proposed by Yuan-zhuo et al. [16] , a rapid modeling method for cyberspace security problems was designed based on the stochastic attack and defense game model. Furthermore by this model, they could conduct the network attack-defense process analysis and prediction. Erwin and Alex [17] proposed a Markov game model for network confrontation analysis and designed an algorithm to select optimal strategies.
However, previous researches failed to characterize the real-time of defense decision-making, which combined the traditional static games or dynamic games with Markov process. Referring to differential games, we establish a game model to analyze dynamic, continuous and real-time attackdefense processes and come up with a novel method of defense strategy selection with respect to time. We significantly improve the timeliness of decision-making methods and scope of application by applying the Markov decisionmaking method. Since the differential game is a continuous changing process in the multi-dimensional phase space, the game process is generally described by the differential equation and the game equilibrium is a functional form, which is solved as a variational problem [18] . Therefore, it is very difficult to construct and apply the model. Furthermore, things will become more complicated if we combine the model with Markov theory. To the best of our knowledge, there is no public literature that discusses the mentioned methods.
In this work, we transform the network attack and defense during certain time into a multi-stage and continuous attackdefense process with short duration in each stage to describe the actual network confrontation. We establish a Markov attack-defense differential game model based on the theory of differential game and Markov decision-making for the first time. Using differential games to conduct the real-time attack and defense analysis in all stages, we predict the possible transition paths in different stages based on the Markov transition probability. Furthermore, we introduce a discount factor µ on the different game stages when conducting the discount treatment to take into consideration the process of payoffs decay. We calculate the total discount payoffs of attack-defense game to design the objective function. Based on the solution and analysis of multi-stage game equilibrium, we design the optimal defense strategy selection algorithm. With simulation we verify the effectiveness of our model and method. Compared with the existing works, the method and model proposed in this work does a better job mimicing the actual network attack and defense. And the selection method of optimal defense strategy has better timeliness and practicability for network security.
II. MARKOV ATTACK-DEFENSE DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODEL A. ANALYSIS OF MARKOV ATTACK-DEFENSE DIFFERENTAIL GAME PROCESS
In the classical differential games, when the dynamic game process starts from the initial system state S 0 , the equilibrium strategy (or optimal strategy) of the game is a time path, where the game results and the state changes of the system can be determined. However, different disturbance factors and accidental factors emerge inevitably. For a short period of time, the system can still resist the interference and maintain the deterministic game process. If the situation proceeds, the system states will inevitably break through the deterministic process and unpredictable changes will happen. In the attack-defense process of the network information system, the game results directly cause the change of the system states. In addition, the change of the network system's operating environment, man-made adjustments and accidental disturbances also affect the system states. Therefore, the complete application of a classic differential game to predict the network attack and defense process is not consistent with the actual situation. It can not accurately characterize the complete system changes within a certain period of time. With respect to the actual network attack and defense, we can see that the players' behavior is difficult to maintain on the path controlled by the equilibrium strategy in a long time. Besides, when the system state changes, the attacker and defender will start the next differential game stage in the new state S i , where all the goals, preferences, and available strategy sets are subjected to change. Thus the multi-stage differential game is more suitable for describing and analyzing the dynamic process of network attack and defense.
The network attack-defense process generally has limits with incomplete information. On one hand, it is difficult for players to capture perfectly the game system environment information, preference selection of enemy strategy and payoffs of decision-making execution. On the other hand, there are many uncertain factors that may cause random changes of both network system state and game strategy, making it difficult to carry out a complete quantitative and mathematical analysis. Therefore, the network attack and defense with a certain duration is transformed into the multistage attack-defense process within short periods of time in each stage in this work. Then we use differential game to realize the dynamic attack-defense analysis in each stage and draw on the Markov process to describe the state transition between different stages. Based on the combination of differential game theory and Markov decision-making method, we construct a multi-stage and multi-state Markov differential game model to analyze the real-time attack-defense behavior and solve the continuous defense decision-making problem.
Markov attack and defense differential game process is shown in Fig. 1 , which is a multi-stage and multi-state process with states changing dynamically over time. During a certain period of time, both attacker and defender start continuous decision-making and dynamic confrontation from the initial state which will evolve to the ending state by taking the game equilibrium strategy as the optimal control trajectory. With the passage of time, due to the impact of the attack-defense behavior and the possible changes of system environment and game elements, the network system jumps from one state to another state with a probability η, where the next attack and defense game stage will start. To the complete attack-defense process, the system is in the process of ''attack-defense game -state transition -attack-defense game''. Based on the analysis mentioned, we construct the multi-stage Markov attack and defense differential game model. By introducing the discount factor µ, we quantify the expected total return from the initial stage to the final stage of the game as the objective function of players. Eventually, we achieve the game equilibrium solution and the defense strategy selection.
B. MARKOV ATTACK-DEFENSE DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODEL
Since the multi-stage Markov attack and defense differential game is composed of many independent and similar singlestage differential games, we at first analyze the single-stage attack and defense differential game, and then establish the Markov attack and defense differential game model in this section.
In the attack and defense in network system with numbers of nodes, the security state of the system nodes keeps changing. Moreover, the number of nodes in different security states changes dynamically. In order to characterize this process, we use the SIR model of infectious disease dynamics VOLUME 6, 2018 theory [19] , [20] to classify the nodes in the network as individuals in the SIR model, and extend the model to the security state evolution model NIRM. State Transition N→I: As the defense strategy fails, the normal node is infected, but the destructive effect is in the latent period at this moment. Furthermore the attacker can use this node to attack the adjacent node.
Nodes in model NIRM
State Transition N→R: As the defense strategy succeeds, normal nodes have the immunity to attacks.
State Transition I→R: The defense strategy identifies infected nodes and clears the infection, which avoids the further loss of infected nodes and transforms them into an immune state.
State Transition I→M: As the defense strategy fails and damaging effect occurs, infected nodes lose service function.
We suppose the total number of network nodes is Q, and the number of nodes in four states at time t is denoted by variables N (t), I (t), R(t) and M (t). For an infected node, the number of directly connected nodes is π θ when nodes are deployed in the network at a density θ. Therefore if assuming that the number of network nodes is large and the infected nodes are far away from each other, the number of normal nodes directly connected with the infected node at time t will be θπ I (t)N (t)/Q, when ignoring the overlap effect of the infected nodes' influence range.
Then according to the attack strength, we divide the attack strategy into three types: strong-intensity attack A H , mediumintensity attack A M , and weak-intensity attack A L , whose average attack strength can be expressed in turn as To analyze the state transition path by the attack and defense expected utility η(t), we can get the following transition parameters η NI , η NR , η IR , and η IM that denote the possibility of state transition respectively:
In summary, we can describe the security state changing process of the network nodes by the following differential equations.
For the state transition N→I, N→R or I→R, and I→M, let the payoff coefficients be r 1 , r 2 and r 3 in turn. Due to lots of factors that affect the payoff coefficient, the payoff coefficient is generally a non-linear formula. For the convenience of following analysis, we use the statistical average to define the payoff coefficient r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ∈ [0, 10], referring to [21] . We investigate the accurate calculation method of payoff coefficient for the next step of our research.
According to the above analysis, we can obtain the defense return r D (t) and attack return r A (t) at time t as follow:
Since the execution of both the attack and the defense strategies will consume expenditure usually proportional to their corresponding effectiveness, referring to [11] , we define the strategic execution cost v D and v A at t as follows:
where c D and c A mean the cost / utility coefficient for defense and attack strategies with c D , c A ∈ [1, 10] . Taking into account the return and cost of strategies, we can get the payoff function of both the attacker and defender as follows.
Definition 1: Markov Attack-Defense Differential Game Model can be expressed as a ten-tuple MADG = (N , K , S, B, t, x, P, η, µ, U ), where
is the player space of Markov attackdefense differential game, in which the defender is N D and the attacker is N A .
(2) K is the total number of stages in a multi-stage game, and we use G(k) to define the game process in k-th stage with
In this work, we divide the network attack and defense during a certain time [t bin , t end ] into K stages with a short time T for each stage, where the duration time of the game stage 
} is the control strategy of both the attacker and defender in the game stage G(k), which is a timevariable control trajectory.
Then, we define P k
p k D (t) j = 1 to describe the mixed strategy chosen by the defender at time t in the game stage G(k), and
p k A (t) i = 1 to describe the mixed strategy chosen by the attacker at time t.
(8) η ij = η(S j |S i ) denotes the probability that the system will jump from state S i to state S j , defined as a probability matrix.
(9) µ is the discount factor, which indicates the discount ratio of the payoff in the k-th game stage to that in the initial stage, with 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1.
(10) U = {U k D , U k A } is the game payoff function set. We define U k D and U k A as the payoff function of the defender and attacker in the k-th game stage.
Then we design an objective criteria function R to determine the merits of both attacker and defender. The common objective criteria functions include the discount expectation criterion function and the average return criterion function [17] . Due to the relationship of the game payoff and time, we design the discount expectation criteria function by introducing the discount factor µ, as follows:
And the function form of U k D and U k A refers to (6-7). In (8), we can see that the objective criterion function is the sum of the payoff U A (or U D ) in the game stage G(k) and the future discount payoff e,h∈ [k,K ] µη(S h |S e )R h (S h 0 , S h ), which both the attacker and defender aim to maximize.
III. GAME EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION AND DEFENSE STRATEGY SELECTION ALGORITHM DESIGN A. GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In the network confrontation process, both the attacker and defender attempt to maximize their own payoffs. In the multistage Markov attack-defense differential game, according to the differential game theory [13] , we define the optimal control strategy (P k A (t) * , P k D (t) * ) in the k-th stage satisfying:
Since the network attack-defense process is constructed by multiple game stages, each of which is subjected to the attack-defense game behavior in the previous stage, each player must have a Markov optimal response strategy [22] referring to Markov decision criteria. If the Markov optimal response strategy is
, that is the following conditions are satisfied in any stage G(k):
From (8) we can see that the state transition probability η directly affects the calculation of discount payoffs. Thus it affects the value of the objective function, which has a direct effect on the selection of the optimal attack-defense strategy. The attack and defense process consists of k game stages with the limited stage number k. Meanwhile the strategy sets DS k and AS k in each stage and the game payoffs of both players are limited. As a result, MADG is a multi-stage and multistate finite Markov differential game model. According to the basic theorem of differential game and the conclusion of literature [17] , [22] , we can prove the existence of multi-stage equilibrium strategy.
Theorem 1: The mixed strategy game equilibrium of the multi-stage Markov attack-defense differential game MADG exists.
Proof: Above all, the MADG consists of several independent and similar single-stage differential games. Since each independent single-stage differential game belongs to the finite game, the basic theorem of differential game [13] shows that the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and the saddlepoint strategy (or optimal control strategy) exist. Moreover, according to the definition of multi-stage Markov differential game model, there is a finite stochastic game equivalent with MADG, whose payoff function is a convex function based on the transition probability and payoff functions. According to the existence theorem of equilibrium strategy in finite stochastic game [17] , [22] , we can prove that this stochastic game has the mixed strategy game equilibrium. In summary, the multi-stage mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of MADG exists.
According to Section II, we adopt a fixed time T to divide the continuous attack-defense process into multiple stages, and carry out game analysis. Moreover, we assume that the game system can reach an equilibrium state within the time T . Based on the above statements, the rationality of multi-stage division and multi-stage mixed strategy game equilibrium can be guaranteed referring to Theorem 1.
However, taking into account the complexity of the actual attack-defense game and the randomness of network system state changes, if the time T of the game stage is not fixed or the system state transition occurs before the game stage reaches equilibrium, this method is difficult to guarantee the rationality of division results and multi-stage game equilibrium. To solve this problem, we will study the game analysis method combined with differential game and stochastic Petri net in the future research, to analyze a multistage attack and defense process with changing time-length in each stage.
B. GAME EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION
The Markov attack-defense game model established in this work consists of several game stages. Based on the equilibrium solution of single-stage differential game in Section III, we introduce a discount factor µ to convert the payoffs in the future stage to the discount payoffs in the initial stage, addressing the problem of payoffs calculation in the multi-stage attack and defense. Based on what is mentioned, the multi-stage equilibrium strategy solution is transformed into a dynamic programming problem to maximize the overall payoffs.
In the k-th game stage, P k D (t) and P k A (t) represent the control strategies of the attacker and defender respectively and by solving (11) , as shown at the bottom of this page, we can obtain the optimal control strategy set {(P k A (t) * , P k D (t) * )}, that is the equilibrium strategy set of the multi-stage game. According to the game theory, the mixed strategy (P k A (t) * , P k D (t) * ) is the best choice for both the attacker and defender in the k-th game stage, hence the defender should select the optimal defense strategy P k D (t) * . Since the equilibrium of the differential game is a functional form with respect to time and its solution is the variational problem [13] , the problem is difficult to solve and generally does not have analytic solution. However, using the dynamic programming method and mathematic calculation software such as MATLAB [23] , we can obtain the numerical solution that satisfies the actual precision in a limited time.
C. OPTIMAL DEFENSE STRATEGY SELECTION ALGORITHM DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
Based on the above analysis, we design the optimal defense strategy selection algorithm for the multi-stage Markov attack-defense differential game.
By this algorithm, we could analyze the changing process of single-stage strategy selection over time and the strategies payoffs, and then find the discount payoffs of k stages by the discount criterion. Finally, we use the dynamic programming 
; // more details in the appendix; 9. Calculate the game payoffs U k µη eh R h A (S h 0 , S h ) by the discount factor µ and the equation (8); 11. Based on the dynamic programming method in the Section III, let the equations max
as the objective functions, and the optimal defense strategy set {(P k A (t) * , P k D (t) * )} can be obtained by solving the equation (11); 12. Return {P k D (t) * }; //output the optimal defense strategies of each stage; END method to solve the optimal defense strategy of multi-stage attack-defense process, completing the behavioral analysis and the defense decision-making in multi-stage network attack and defense.
We compare the method proposed in this paper with other literature, with the results shown in Table 1 . Due to the dynamic evolvement of the network attack-defense process and the randomness of the system state changes, we conduct the attack-defense game research based on the differential game and Markov decision theory, which is more realistic. The game process characterizes the ability of analyzing and modeling network attack-defense process. If being able to characterize multi-stage and time-continuous attack and defense process, the model can analyze more complex and continuous network attack and defense, which can play a more guiding role in defense decision-making. The model versatility means whether the type set and the strategy set in the model can be extended to n. If yes, it illustrates that the model has better versatility; otherwise, it illustrates that the model is only suitable for certain situations and has poor applicability. Equilibrium solution denotes whether the computational solution for the equilibrium is given in the work. The equilibrium of Markov differential game changes in real time, thus the solution process is more complicated. Without detailed calculation methods and steps, it will reduce the practical application ability.
Decision-making timeliness refers to the effective time of the decision-making results. If we only consider the one-shot confrontation, it can be regarded as single-stage attack and defense, and the optimal strategy is only suitable to singlestage. If the process is considered as a dynamic multi-stage process, then we can use the discrete multi-stage game to analyze it and the optimal sequence is the optimal strategy in all discrete stages. Due to the fast network attack-defense process and the complicated factors that affect the system state, the action transformation tends to be of high frequency and the state changes are random. Therefore, the defense decision-making needs to be continuous and real-time for the timeliness improvement of decision-making results. Otherwise, the optimal strategy may not adapt to the attackdefense rhythm and lose its effectiveness. In this work, we can calculate the strategy control function over time based on the Markov differential game model to realize the real-time selection of the optimal strategy. And our method has better decision-making timeliness than other methods.
From the comparison, we can see that Markov attackdefense differential game model proposed in this work transforms network attack and defense with a certain duration into a multi-stage attack and defense process with K stages, each of which lasts for a short time T . Thus we can analyze the multi-stage, multi-state and continuous attack-defense process by the model. Moreover, the objective function based on the total discount payoffs achieves a comprehensive calculation of multi-stage attack-defense game payoffs. The strategy selection algorithm for multi-stage attack-defense process can select the optimal defense strategy in real time, which has clear algorithm steps and is easy to implement. Compared with other models as well as the methods in Table 1 , our work has better theoretical value and practicality.
IV. SIMULATION EXPERIMENT AND ANALYSIS

A. DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
In this section, we conducted series of simulation experiments to verify Markov attack-defense differential game model and the optimal defense strategy selection method. In the experiment, we applied the simulation tool used widely, Scalable Simulation Framework (SSFNet) [24] , which can simulate network attack-defense scenarios with different scales and initial states by setting different parameters. In order to improve the authenticity of the simulation experiments, we utilized an autonomous system connection dataset derived from the Route Views Project referring to [25] to design the topological structure of the experimental system. The dataset used is that of 2018.2.16 (NetTFData20180216103000) and we set the number of nodes Q = 1915 in the simulation experiment. Among them, the number of nodes in the user terminal cluster is 1800, the number of nodes in the web server cluster is 50, the number of application server clusters is 35 (including server groups such as E-Mail, FTP, SMTP and streaming video), and the number of nodes in the data server cluster is 30 (including file storage and database server groups). Besides, the experimental system structure is analyzed by the method of [16] and [17] . Based on the analysis of node states in Section II, the security states of network system are divided into 9 types as shown in Table 2 .
In Table 2 , we list out the description of the initial state S k 0 at different stages. Starting from the initial state S k 0 , the attack-defense differential game reaches the ending state S k when this game stage is over. We can see that the specific condition of the ending state is determined by the results of the attack-defense differential game. Hence, referring to [26] and [27] and assuming that the state transition probability is fixed, we determine the transition probabilities between stages based on historical data and expert experience as shown in Table 3 .
Access control rules limit the user terminal with only access to the Web server, while the system Web server and the application server can access the data server. Based on the National Information Security Vulnerability Database (CNNVD) [28] , we analyzed the routing settings and vulnerability information by the method in [14] and [17] . Then referring to MIT's attack and defense behavior databases [29] , we constructed the attack and defense strategy set, as shown in Table 4 and Table 5 .
B. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
From the view of the actual network confrontation, we set the attack and defense process to continue for 40min, which is divided into four stages with each stage during time T = 10min. Setting discount factor µ = 0.6, we used Matlab 2014 simulation tools to implement the strategy selection algorithm in Section III, whose operation time is 21.6s. The values of state transition probability η and discount factor µ in the experiment are determined by the historical data, the expert knowledge and the specific environment of the experimental system based on the previous researches. As a result, the objectivity and accuracy of the values are not enough. In the next step of our research, we will conduct further research on modeling attack-defense process in largescale network and further optimize the method to determine the state transition probability and discount factor, referring to the multiple attribute sensitivity theory. In the experiments, the network attack and defense is divided into four stages, and the attacker and defender rely on their different strategy sets (see Table 4 and 5) for confrontation. Hence, the states of network nodes change dynamically and the security state of the network system between different stages changes with the transition probability shown in Table 3 .
Taking the data server cluster as the target of attack, there are two main attack paths under the experimental environment. Starting from the state S 1 , the four-stage attack-defense differential game process is composed as follows:
(
In the first stage S 2 0 → S 2 , the optional attack and defense actions are shown in Table 4 and Table 5 (the same below), and the optimal strategy trajectory of both attack and defense is shown in Fig. 2 (a) . After the end of this stage, the network system state jumps from state S 2 to state S 5 0 with the probability η(5|2) = 0.3 (shown in Table 3 , the same below) and the second stage of the game starts. Early in this stage, the attacker mainly selects the low-intensity attack strategy, focusing on the occult attack and permeability. The defender does not sufficiently sense the attack behavior in the early stage and mainly uses medium-intensity defense strategy as the usual defense option when considering the defense cost.
During the later period, the probability of exposure increases as the attack process continues. The attacker begins to attack with high-intensity attack strategy and strives to break the network defense with the way of ''raid + storm''. Correspondingly, the defender mainly adopts the high-intensity defense strategy to respond the attack. The optimal attack strategy at the end of this stage is (0.81, 0.08, 0.11), and the optimal defense strategy is (0.8, 0.2, 0).
In the second stage S 5 0 → S 5 , the optimal strategy trajectory of both attack and defense is shown in Fig. 2 (b) . After the first attack-defense stage, the intent of both attacker and defender gradually clear. In the early period, both the attacker and the defender employ continuous countermeasures with high-intensity strategies. With the passage of time, the attacker increases the selection probability of lowmedium-strength strategies considering the strategy implementation cost, and the defender mainly takes a moderate defense strategy correspondingly. The optimal attack strategy at the end of this stage is (0.11,0.28,0.61), and the optimal defense strategy is (0.2,0.62,0.18).
In the third stage of S 7 0 → S 7 , the optimal strategy trajectory of both the attack and defense are shown in Fig. 2 (c) . In this stage, the attacker's goal is to maximize the number of nodes that has gained the root privilege in the application server cluster for the next attack on the data server cluster. At the beginning, both the attacker and defender still adopt VOLUME 6, 2018 the high-intensity strategy for the continuous confrontation. Gradually the attacker started to focus on the medium-highintensity attack strategy. Since the application server cluster belongs to the core assets of the network information system, the defender is highly vigilant and continues to select the strong defense strategy. The optimal attack strategy at the end of this phase is (0.2,0.61,0.19) and the optimal defense strategy is (0.71,0.02,0.27).
In the fourth stage S 9 0 → S 9 , the optimal strategic trajectory of both attack and defense as shown in Fig. 2 (d) . The attacker attacks the ultimate goal ( the data server cluster ), the probability of taking medium and high-intensity attack strategy remains above 0.7. Meanwhile the defender selects the entire high-intensity defense strategy to protect the key information assets with a strategy selection probability above 0.5. The optimal strategy of the attacker and defender at the end of this stage are (0.38,0.5,0.12) and (0.7,0.19,0.11) relatively.
As shown in Table 6 , the total payoffs of the attacker and the defender in the first attack path are 172.3 and −120.9 relatively.
(2)
The optimal strategy trajectory in the first stage is the same as that in Fig. 2 (a) , and the optimal strategy trajectories in the second, third and fourth stages are shown as Fig. 3 (a) -(c) respectively. The specific analysis is similar to the previous one and will not be repeated here. In the second attack path, according to the game payoffs of the attacker and defender in each stage shown in Table 6 , the attacker's total payoff is 114.6 and defense total payoff is −61. 6 .
From the analysis of the experimental data, we can see that there is a significant difference between the total attackdefense payoffs of the two attack paths. The total attack and defense payoffs in path 1 are 114.6 and −61.6 relatively, while those in path 2 are 172.3 and −120.9. Therefore, from the defensive perspective, we prefer to path 1. And the defender should try to avoid path 2. Through the comparative analysis, the first stage of the two paths are both the attackdefense game process S 2 0 → S 2 . However, the two paths are different at the end of this stage.While the state of path 1 changes to S 2 → S 5 0 , that of path 2 changes to S 2 → S 4 0 . In order to reduce the probability of path 2, the defender should reduce the probability of state change S 2 → S 4 0 . If the system cannot reach the state S 4 0 , path 2 will be avoided and attackdefense process will go along with path 1, which meets the defender's expectation. Further analysis shows that the second stage of attack-defense game in path 1 is S 5 0 → S 5 , while that in path 2 is S 4 0 → S 4 , between which there are differences in attack action sets (see Table 4 ). As the strategy set is an important element of attack-defense game, it directly determines the game process and its outcome causing the system state changes. Therefore, for AS = {Http LQ-sniffer, Attack SSH on Web Server, Sr-Hard blood} of the attack-defense game second stage S 4 0 → S 4 in path 2, the defender can increase the proactive defense strategy, such as dynamically adjust network access ports, whitelist, install anti-sniffing devices and so on to improve defense capabilities and reduce the probability of state S 2 changing to S 4 0 , which will reduce the possibility that the attack path 2 may occur.
V. CONCLUSION
At the present, researches on network attack-defense analysis by game theory are mostly limited to static games or discrete multi-stage dynamic attack-defense games. For rapidlychanging and continuous network attack and defense, the existing models and methods cannot meet the realistic requirements. As a result, we combined the differential game with the Markov decision method and constructed Markov attack-defense differential game model in this work to analyze the attack-defense process with multiple stages during a short duration of time. Furthermore, we proposed the equilibrium solution method based on dynamic programming and designed the multi-stage optimal defense strategy selection algorithm. Besides, we also verified the effectiveness of the model and method by simulation experiments. Compared with the existing works, our model and method balance the real-time character of network defense decision-making and the randomness of the security state changes, providing an effective model and method for the research on the continuous and real-time attack and defense with better timeliness and stronger reliability.
Our future work includes further research on typical active defense technologies such as moving target defense as well as mimicry defense and studying the operation mechanism of active defense effectiveness by analyzing their working principles and modes. Moreover, we will carry out more researches on the probability of state transition from the perspective of multi-attribute to increase the calculation accuracy.
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APPENDIX
In the appendix, we illustrate the specific method to solve the saddle-point strategy in the differential game, with more details referring to literature [20] . A detailed demonstration is carried out by the example in Section II. The total number of nodes in the example is Q, and the numbers of nodes in four states at time t are N (t), I (t), R (t) and M (t), respectively. According to the attack strength, the attack strategies are divided into strong-intensive, medium-intensive and weakintensive attack strategies, which are expressed as A H , A M and A L . Similarly, the defense strategies are divided into strong-intensive and weak-intensive strategies expressed as D H and D L .
Based on the existence theorem of saddle-point strategy of differential game [20] , the process and steps of solving saddle point strategy (P * A (t), P * D (t)) are put forward.
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For defenders, the Hamilton function is constructed based on the attack and defense differential game model as follows: + η IR (t)I (t) K K R A (t), K M A (t)) T , the dynamic programming method is used to solve the saddle-point strategy.
First, we calculate the following dynamic programming problem in (6) as shown at the bottom of the previous page.
Then we can get (N * (t), I * (t), R * (t), M * (t)). Setting (9) (10) (11) as shown at the bottom of the previous page, respectively.
